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ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND PROTECTION OF 
FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS: A REVIEW OF THE 
ICJ’S RULING ON ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE 
IRAN-U.S. TREATY OF AMITY 
Seyed M. H. Razavi & Fateme Zeynodini† 
Abstract: This article studies the unilateral regime of sanctions and their impact 
on two fundamental human rights: the right to food and the right to health. This article 
argues that international tribunals will set the level of obligation required to protect these 
human rights by observing the empirical correlation between economic sanctions and the 
deterioration of these rights in target states. By reviewing the elements that contribute to 
the strength of punitive economic measures, this article shows how sanctions have a 
greater impact on a population. This article concludes that the more powerful the 
economic sanctions, the higher the level of obligation of the imposing state will be to 
ensure that the sanctioned state’s population’s fundamental rights are protected. 
              
           
       
I. INTRODUCTION 
Economic sanctions1 have become the most relevant instrument of 
foreign policy designed to respond to a wrongful act or policy of a state,2 
such as aggression,3 support of terrorism,4 involvement in internal wars,5 and 
 
†  Seyed Mohamad Hassan Razavi is Assistant Professor at University of Tehran, Faculty of Law 
and Political Science. Fateme Zeynodini is Ph.D. in Law from University of Montreal, Faculty of Law. The 
authors can be contacted at hassan.razavi@ut.ac.ir. 
1  See generally Thomas W. Walde, Managing the Risk of Sanctions in the Global Oil & Gas 
Industry: Corporate Response under Political, Legal and Commercial Pressures, 36 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 184 
(2001) (“economic sanctions” generally refer to specific punitive economic actions which goes further than 
the traditional trade-based models of sanctions and includes any effective restrictive measures). 
2  Jana Ilieva, Aleksandar Dashtevski, & Filip Kokotovic, Economic Sanctions in International Law, 
9 UTMS J. ECON. 201, 201 (2018). 
3  For example, economic sanction against Germany in 1930s. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., 
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 5 (2d ed. 1990). 
4  For example, economic sanction against Libya in late 1980s and early 1990s. Id. at 16. 
5  For example, economic sanctions against internal wars in Somalia, Liberia, Angola, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone and FR Yugoslavia (Kosovo). Id. at 28–32. 
Cite as: Seyed M. H. Razavi & Fateme Zeynodini, Economic Sanctions and Protection of 
Fundamental Human Rights: A Review of the ICJÕ s Ruling on Alleged Violations of the 
Iran-U.S. Treaty of Amity, 29 WASH. INTÕ L L.J. 303 (2020).
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the violation of human rights.6 Sanctions are primarily imposed to change 
the behavior of the wrongdoer state. However, they have been widely used 
as an instrument to induce regime change7 or even as a complement to war.8 
The increasing global interdependence associated with the flow of 
goods and services has significantly increased the power of economic 
sanctions, making them a potentially devastating policy for the target 
country’s people. Economic sanctions, which are often designed to address 
violations of civil and political rights of the wrongdoer states, instead 
undermine the economic and social rights of the people living in the target 
country.9 
The negative humanitarian impact of economic sanctions has raised 
questions on the limits to which embargoes should extend in order to punish 
the wrongful deeds of a target country. This inquiry extends to whether 
sanctioning states have any responsibility and the duty of care for the effects 
of their prohibitive regulations and, if so, where the responsibility of 
sanctioning states lies regarding the humanitarian impact of such restrictive 
measures.  
To address these issues, the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts,10 adopted by the International Law 
Commission (“ILC”) in August 2001, developed a legal framework for when 
a state is held responsible for breaching an international obligation and the 
adoption of countermeasures between states. Article 50(1)(b) of the Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States requires that the adoption of 
countermeasures by states shall not affect “obligations for the protection of 
fundamental human rights.”11 The strong language of the Article 50(1)(b) 
raises a question as to the level of obligation a sanctioning state is subject to 
 
6  See PETER WALLENSTEEN, A CENTURY OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: A FIELD REVISITED 2 (2000). 
7  Lenina Pomeranz, Economic Sanctions as a Political Instrument in International Relations, 3 
REVISTA TEMPO DO MUNDO 181, 193 (2017). 
8  David J. Lektzian & Christopher M. Sprecher, Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict, 51 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 415, 415 (2007). 
9  Amy Howlett, Getting “Smart”: Crafting Economic Sanctions That Respect All Human Rights, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1199, 1200 (2004). 
10  See generally Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, With Commentaries, Work if Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001). 
11  Id. at 131. 
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when ensuring that its economic countermeasures do not affect the 
protection of fundamental human rights. 
Similarly, the ruling of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) 
regarding Iran’s request for the application of provisional measures in 
Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and 
Consular Rights (Iran v. United States), issued October 3, 2018, was a step 
forward in establishing a higher level of obligation on the United States for 
the extraterritorial effects of its unilateral sanctions. The ICJ found that 
rights asserted by Iran under the 1955 Treaty of Amity, “so far as they relate 
to the importation and purchase of goods required for humanitarian needs[,]” 
are plausible and not even the treaty’s national security exception can 
prohibit Iran’s right to humanitarian goods.12 The ICJ went a step further, 
ruling that the mere existence of specific carve-outs for humanitarian trade 
in the sanctions does not release the United States from its obligations and 
asked the United States to “ensure payments and other transfers of funds . . . 
relat[ing] to [humanitarian] goods and services” are not restricted.13 
This article consists of three main parts. First, it explains the evolution 
of international law and different approaches in addressing the humanitarian 
impact of economic sanctions. Second, it analyzes the elements that 
contribute to the power of a sanction program. In doing so, the article sets 
out a conceptual framework for a higher level of obligation to protect 
fundamental human rights in the face of such powerful economic sanctions. 
Finally, the third part consists of a review and analysis of the ICJ ruling 
regarding Iran’s request for the indication of provisional measures following 
the United States’ withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, also known as the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”). Through examination of 
the ICJ’s ruling, this article concludes that there is a higher level of 
obligation on imposing states to ensure the protection of the fundamental 
human rights of sanctioned states’ populations.  
 
12  Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights 
(Islamic Republic of Iran v. U.S.), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, ¶ 70 (July 16, 2018), 
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/175/175-20180716-REQ-01-00-EN.pdf [hereinafter Iranian 
Provisional Measures]. 
13  Id. ¶ 98. 
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II. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND RIGHT TO FOOD AND MEDICINE 
Post-Cold War developments in international law and the integration 
of national economies have contributed to the increased strength and 
effectiveness of economic sanctions.14 As such, economic sanctions became 
a desirable and popular policy tool in the post-Cold War period.15 The 
United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”), the body tasked with the 
adoption of multilateral sanctions under the UN Charter, resorted to these 
measures thirteen times throughout the 1990s.16 The United States was the 
most frequent user of economic sanctions, sanctioning more than thirty-five 
countries between 1993 and 1996.17 This evolution transformed economic 
sanctions from isolated “emergency incidents” in foreign affairs to a 
common feature in foreign and national security policy.18 
International trade plays a key role in the realization of both the right 
to food19 and health. Cross-border trade provides opportunities “to reduce 
hunger and poverty in many of the developing countries.”20 In order to 
provide access to adequate food and life-saving medicine, it is necessary that 
these goods transfer from production sites to places of consumption. 
Exportation of these essential goods from countries producing to countries 
consuming them is a major element in increasing food and medicine 
 
14  William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg, The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions, in 
2 HANDBOOK OF DEFENSE ECONOMICS 868, 869 (Todd Sandler & Keith Hartley eds., 2007) (“Historically, 
economic sanctions . . . were used by Napoleon in the Continental System commencing in 1806, by 
Thomas Jefferson in the Embargo Act of 1807, and by the League of Nations against Italy in 1935 . . . .”). 
15  See generally Joy Gordon, Economic Sanctions, Just War Doctrine, and the “Fearful Spectacle of 
the Civilian Dead,” 49 CROSSCURRENTS 387 (1999). 
16  See SELECT COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, 2006–7, 
HL 96-I, ¶ 17 (UK) (UNSC has “imposed sanctions against Afghanistan, Angola, Cote d’Ivoire, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia and Eritrea, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, the former Yugoslavia, North Korea and Iran”). 
17  William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg, Unilateral Versus Multilateral International 
Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective, 43 INT’L STUD. Q., 37, 37 (1999). 
18  Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, 22 INT’L SEC. 90, 90 (1997). 
19  See, e.g., Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 12: The Right to 
Adequate Food (Art. 11), E/C.12/1999/5 (1999) [hereinafter General Comment No. 12] (the realization of 
right to food refers to the availability of food, physically and financially, either through feeding oneself 
from production or international trade—i.e., movement from the production site to the place of 
consumption). 
20  Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N., Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of 
the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security, adopted Its One Hundred Twenty-
Seventh Session, ¶ 7 (2004) [hereinafter Information and Case Studies]. 
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security.21 The dependence of developing and underdeveloped countries on 
the importation of foodstuffs and medicines has made restrictions on access 
to international markets and the free movement of goods and services an 
effective strategy for the sanctioning state to achieve its foreign policy goals 
with significant negative consequences.22 
The sanctioning countries have treated the trade of humanitarian 
goods (food and medicine) differently in their various sanction programs 
since World War II. This differential treatment is mainly due to differing 
views of sanctions—some countries regarded them as a full and efficient 
alternative to military intervention, while others viewed them as a mere 
instrument of foreign policy, just one part of a forced escalation curve.23 The 
most extreme position taken included using punitive measures with regards 
to the trade of food and medicine and the silence of sanction regulation on 
permissibility of trade of humanitarian goods.  
Punitive measures on humanitarian goods were manifested in forms, 
such as the sanctioning nation removing food aid24 and refusing to grant 
credit for purchasing food and medicine.25 These forms of sanctions have a 
devastating impact on countries which depend largely on the flow of 
humanitarian aid to their territories, or on the grant of credit for their food 
and medicine industries.26  
The structure of restrictive measures gradually moved from silence on 
humanitarian goods toward the inclusion of a specific carve-out for 
humanitarian goods in the sanction regulations. An explicit exemption was 
made by the UNSC to exclude medical supplies and foodstuffs when 
 
21  See World Food Summit, Rome Declaration on World Food Security ¶ 37 (1996) [hereinafter 
Rome Declaration]. 
22  See generally KAMAL MALHOTRA ET AL., MAKING GLOBAL TRADE WORK FOR PEOPLE (2003). 
23  Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime, 
75 CALIF. 1159, 1169 n.20 (1987) (U.S. President Woodrow Wilson stated: “a nation that is boycotted is a 
nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be 
no need for force. It is a terrible remedy. It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted, but it brings a 
pressure upon the nation which, in my judgment, no modern nation could resist.”). 
24  See, e.g., HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 3, at 458 (U.S. sanctions against the Nicaraguan Sandinista 
government included the withdrawal of food assistance). 
25  Howlett, supra note 9, at 1218 (for example, the United States’ refusal to grant Poland $740 
million of credit to buy U.S. corn caused domestic food shortages due to the Polish poultry industry’s 
dependence on U.S. feed corn). 
26  Howlett, supra note 9, at 1217. 
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sanctioning the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).27 
Regarding unilateral state-to-state sanctions, the U.S. embargoes against 
Nicaragua and Haiti also provided for similar exemptions.28  
A humanitarian crisis occurred when the UNSC imposed 
comprehensive sanctions against Iraq. The UNSC resolution provided an 
explicit exemption for “supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, 
in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs,”29 and a subsequent exclusion for 
foodstuffs from the application of trade prohibitions in another resolution.30  
However, the comprehensive nature of the economic sanctions against 
Iraq following the 1991 Persian Gulf War destroyed almost the entirety of 
Iraq’s infrastructure. It dramatically reduced the importation of food and 
caused an exhaustion of food stockpiles, which led to the implementation of 
food rationing in Iraq. The twenty-five-fold increase in prices of non-
rationed food and the shortfall in production led to massive malnutrition 
amongst the population. The destruction of Iraq’s infrastructure had an 
impact on health care; diseases spread due to contaminated water, severe 
malnutrition increased, and there was a lack of access to primary health care 
and life-saving medicines.31 The imposition of comprehensive economic 
sanctions has been seen as a form of collective punishment on civilian 
populations. Some scholars have compared this to blowing up an airplane 
containing innocent passengers to kill a terrorist,32 or killing cells 
indiscriminately to kill a cancer.33 
III. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACT OF ECONOMIC 
SANCTIONS 
The mere imposition of unilateral economic sanctions, irrespective of 
the existence of a bilateral or multilateral commitment, would not be in 
 
27  S.C. Res. 757, ¶ 4(c) (May 30, 1992). 
28  Richard Garfield, Julia Devin, & Joy Fausey, The Health Impact of Economic Sanctions, 72 
BULLETIN OF THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF MEDICINE 454, 458–62 (1995). 
29  S.C. Res. 661, ¶ 3(c) (Aug. 6, 1990). 
30  S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 20 (Apr. 3, 1991). 
31  Garfield, Devin, & Fausey, supra note 28, at 464–65. 
32  Howlett, supra note 9, at 1217. 
33  Id.  
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breach of an obligation under general international law.34 According to the 
ICJ, “[a] state is not bound to continue particular trade relations longer than 
it sees fit to do so.”35 In this context, the traditional Westphalian approach to 
international public law considers the wrongdoer state responsible for a 
violation of international law. As such, the consequences of such a violation 
impact its own population.  
However, with the development of human rights and international 
treaties, the humanitarian impact of economic sanctions has come under 
scrutiny. From a human rights perspective, the ideal situation is that states 
avoid imposing any unilateral measure which “impedes the full achievement 
of economic and social development by the populations of the affected 
countries.”36 The humanitarian analysis of economic sanctions has raised the 
question as to whether a sanctioning state has any responsibility and duty of 
care for the indirect effects of its prohibitive regulations.37 
The early efforts of international legal scholars and writers have 
focused on drawing analogies with laws applicable to war conditions.38 They 
believed that the effects of economic blockades imposed on a population 
was comparable to wartime blockades under the law of armed conflicts. This 
led some writers to look for similarities between some principles of 
international humanitarian law applicable to armed conflict situations—such 
as the prohibition on starvation of civilians or the free passage of essential 
food and medicine—to the economic sanctions situation.39 While the 
commentators generally reject the argument that sought to include non-
military interventions (e.g., unilateral economic sanctions) within the scope 
 
34  See Antonios Tzanakopoulos, State Responsibility For “Targeted Sanctions,” 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 
UNBOUND, 135, 138 (2019). 
35  Military and Paramilitary Activates in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 276 (June 27). 
36 Information and Case Studies, supra note 20, ¶ 3 (emphasis added). See also Maastricht Principles 
on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ETO 
CONSORTIUM (Jan. 2013), https://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/main-navigation/library/maastricht-
principles/?tx_drblob_pi1%5BdownloadUid%5D=23 [hereinafter Maastricht Principles].  
37  Idriss Jazairy, Unilateral Economic Sanctions, International Law, and Human Rights, 33 
CARNEGIE COUNCIL FOR ETHICS IN INT’L AFFS. 291, 291 (2019). 
38  See, e.g., Garfield, Devin, & Fausey, supra note 28. 
39  Hans-Peter Gasser, Collective Economic Sanctions and International Humanitarian Law—An 
Enforcement Measure Under the United Nations Charter and the Right of Civilians to Immunity: An 
Unavoidable Clash of Policy Goals?, 56 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND 
VÖLKERRECHT [ZAORV] 871, 901 (1996). 
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of the UN Charter Article 2(4) prohibiting the use of force,40 international 
human rights laws and literature are, to some extent, sensitive to discussions 
regarding the similarities between the effects of economic sanctions and war 
on civilian populations. When discussing the obligations unaffected by 
countermeasures, the UN International Law Commission refers to the 
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions relating to the protection of 
victims of international armed conflicts to draw an analogy with the 
prohibition, contained therein, of using the “starvation of civilians as a 
method of warfare.”41 The Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on 
the Negative Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures on the Enjoyment of 
Human Rights concludes in its report in 2018 that “the combination of 
comprehensive unilateral coercive measures and the imposition of secondary 
sanctions on third parties unrelated to the dispute are tantamount to a 
peacetime blockade.”42 
A major step toward human rights limitations on economic sanctions 
was at the urging of the UN Commission on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (“CESR”) to states to refrain from enacting food embargoes and 
measures that directly restrict or endanger the production and supply of 
food43 and adequate medicine and medical equipment.44 The CESCR’s 
provision made states imposing sanctions responsible for the direct 
consequences of their food and medicine embargoes, a weapon which some 
claim is still used in modern warfare.45 While the CESCR believes that the 
imposition of economic sanctions does not nullify and diminish the 
obligation of the sanctioned state to protect the human rights of its citizens,46 
 
40  J. Curtis Henderson, Legality of Economic Sanctions Under International Law: The Case of 
Nicaragua, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 180 (1986). 
41  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977, art. 54, ¶ 1, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3; Int’l L. Comm’n Rep., supra note 10. 
42  U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Negative Impact of Unilateral 
Coercive Measures on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, ¶ 34, A/HRC/39/54 (2018). 
43  General Comment No. 12, supra note 19, ¶ 37. 
44  U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the 
Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12), ¶ 41, E/C.12/2000/4 (2000) [hereinafter General Comment 
No. 14]. 
45  JOANNA MACRAE & ANTHONY B. ZWIWI, Food as an Instrument of War in Contemporary African 
Famines: A Review of the Evidence, in 16 DISASTERS 299, 299 (1992). See e.g., Garfield, Devin, & Fausey, 
supra note 28, at 454. 
46 U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 8 on the Work of Its 
Seventeenth Session, E/C.12/1997/8, at ¶ 10 (1997) [hereinafter General Comment No. 8] (“While sanctions 
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it calls on the sanctioning state to distinguish between the basic objectives of 
its sanctions and “the collateral infliction of suffering upon the most 
vulnerable groups within the targeted country.”47   
A major step in developing the role of human rights in the adoption 
and implementation of economic countermeasures and sanctions was the 
creation of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States,48 which aimed at 
codifying and developing customary international law on state responsibility, 
means of reparation49 and the adoption of countermeasures as an instrument 
of response by the injured state. Article 50(1)(b) provides that regardless of 
how grave a state’s wrongful act may be and no matter how critical its 
failure to respect international obligations any countermeasure introduced 
shall not affect the “obligations for protection of fundamental human 
rights.”50 This obligation is addressed to either the sanctioning state51 or the 
sanctioned state52 and imposes certain limits on economic sanctions.53 
Article 50(1)(b)’s strong language54 develops a legal framework for the 
sanctioning state, where the adoption of countermeasures cannot impinge on 
the “protection of fundamental human rights.” The question, then, will be 
whether the sanctioning state’s obligation with regards to its sanction 
measures is only a negative obligation to refrain from imposing de jure 
prohibitions on the trade of humanitarian goods or whether this obligation 
goes further, such that a state could be held liable for the extraterritorial 
effects of its unilateral measures. 
 
will inevitably diminish the capacity of the affected State to fund or support some of the necessary 
measures, the State remains under an obligation to ensure the absence of discrimination in relation to the 
enjoyment of these rights, and to take all possible measures, including negotiations with other States and 
the international community, to reduce to a minimum the negative impact upon the rights of vulnerable 
groups within the society.”). 
47  Id. ¶ 4. 
48  See Int’l Law Comm’n Rep., supra note 10, at 132 cmt. 6–7. 
49  Id. at 129–37 (means of reparation include restitution, compensation, and satisfaction).  
50  Id. at 131. 
51  See Silvia Borelli & Simon Olleson, Obligations Relating to Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Law, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1187–88 (James Crawfordet al. eds., 2010). 
52  HANS MORTEN HAUGEN, THE RIGHT TO FOOD AND THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: WITH A PARTICULAR 
EMPHASIS ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' MEASURES FOR FOOD PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION 365 (2007). 
53  See Int’l Law Comm’n Rep., supra note 10, at 131. 
54  Id. 
312 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 29 NO. 2 
 
IV. PROTECTION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO FOOD AND HEALTH 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”) defines the right to adequate food as a “right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living.”55 This definition refers to physical56 and 
economic57 access to adequate food.58 Similarly, the ICESCR calls on state 
parties to recognize the universal right to physical and mental health,59 
which closely relates to the right to life.60 This requires that facilities and 
goods be available, accessible, acceptable and be of good quality.61 
Despite the general definition of these two rights, the ICESCR put 
forward a minimalistic understanding of the core content of these rights. The 
states’ obligation to comply with the core content of these rights is an 
immediate rather than progressive obligation.62 Accordingly, the ICESCR 
recognizes the fundamental aspect and core obligation of the right to food by 
“recognizing the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger.”63 
Equally, access to life-saving medicines is viewed as a core content, with a 
minimum level of right to health.64 The CESCR calls on states to “refrain at 
all times from imposing embargoes or similar measures restricting the 
supply of another state with adequate medicines and medical equipment.”65 
 
55  G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, at art. 
11 ¶ 1 (Jan. 3, 1976). 
56  General Comment No. 12, supra note 19, ¶ 8 (“availability of food in a quantity and quality 
sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals”). 
57  Id. ¶ 13 (“Financial costs associated with the acquisition of food for an adequate diet” which do 
not threaten “the attainment and satisfaction of other basic needs . . . .”). 
58  Rome Declaration, supra note 21, ¶ 13. 
59  G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), supra note 55, art. 12; see G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, art. 25(1) (Dec. 10, 1948); see also G.A. Res. 44/25, Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, at art. 24 (Nov. 20, 1989). 
60  G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6 (Dec. 16, 
1966) (relating to right to life through increase and/or decrease in infant mortality and life expectancy); see 
also U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 6: Article 6 (Right to Life), ¶ 5 (Apr. 30, 1982) 
[hereinafter General Comment No. 6]. 
61  General Comment No. 14, supra note 44, ¶ 12(d) (“As well as being culturally acceptable, health 
facilities, goods and services must also be scientifically and medically appropriate and of good quality. This 
requires, inter alia, skilled medical personnel, scientifically approved and unexpired drugs and hospital 
equipment, safe and potable water, and adequate sanitation.”). 
62  General Comment No. 12, supra note 19, ¶ 1 (For right to food: CESAR links the identification of 
the medicines to the WHO Model List of Essential Drugs (G.C. 14, ¶ 12(a)). 
63  General Comment No. 6, supra note 60, art. 11(2). 
64  General Comment No. 14, supra note 44, ¶ 43(d). 
65  General Comment No. 14, supra note 44, ¶ 41. 
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In addition, the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligation on Social 
and Economic Rights insist on humanitarian goods and require states to fully 
respect human rights obligations in the “the design, implementation and 
termination of any sanctions regime,” and to refrain from embargoes on 
“goods and services essential to meet core obligations.”66  
Recent sanctions programs generally include food and medicine-
related carve-outs to comply with states’ obligations contained in the human 
rights treaties and the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States. Although 
these humanitarian exemptions have become a universal clause, controversy 
nevertheless exists regarding the effectiveness of these textual exemptions 
and carve-outs in protecting the fundamental rights of the target 
population.67  
The CESCR sets a clear distinction between three levels of human 
rights obligations with which states must comply. These are known as “the 
obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfill.”68 The obligation to respect is 
a negative obligation on states to ensure that they do not adopt measures or 
take actions which violate human rights. The obligation to protect lies 
between the obligation to respect and obligation to fulfill. It goes beyond a 
mere negative obligation of the state by calling upon the states to ensure that 
the human rights in question are not significantly affected by measures 
taken.69 Finally, the obligation to fulfill requires the state to proactively take 
actions that improve living conditions, like individuals’ access to food and 
medicine (obligation to facilitate). If the state is unsuccessful in this, they 
 
66  Maastricht Principles, supra note 36, ¶ 22. 
67  Some sanction programs also view humanitarian exemptions from a business perspective. For 
example in Canada’s Special Economic Measures Act (“SEMA”) 2010 against Iran, Canada expressed its 
business expectation such that despite “areas of trade that are expressly permitted under the Regulations— 
such as trade in wheat, pulses and vaccines, of which Canada is historically a large supplier—which fall 
under the exemption for the provision of food and medicines” these areas will be affected by sanctions “if 
Iran decides to retaliate for the additional measures imposed by choosing alternative suppliers for these 
goods.” Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations, SOR/2010-165 (Can.). 
68  General Comment No. 12, supra note 19, ¶ 15. 
69  General Comment No. 14, supra note 44, ¶ 35 (“Obligations to protect include, inter alia, the 
duties of States to adopt legislation or to take other measures ensuring equal access to health care and 
health-related services provided by third parties; to ensure that privatization of the health sector does not 
constitute a threat to the availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of health facilities, goods and 
services; to control the marketing of medical equipment and medicines by third parties; and to ensure that 
medical practitioners and other health professionals meet appropriate standards of education, skill and 
ethical codes of conduct.”).  
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must provide assistance and aid directly to the individuals (obligation to 
provide).70 
There is a serious doubt concerning whether providing a textual carve-
out for humanitarian goods in a sanction programs releases the sanctioning 
state from its obligation to protect fundamental human rights. The obligation 
to protect requires that a state refrains from taking actions that directly 
affects fundamental human rights. However, the obligation goes further than 
this simple textual carve-out by obligating a state to ensure that impediments 
and obstacles to trade of humanitarian goods are effectively removed. The 
question is therefore how to interpret the scope of a sanctioning state’s 
obligation to remove impediments to the provision of human rights-related 
goods from its sanction regulation, in light of the state’s liability for the 
extraterritorial effects of its domestic measures. 
A. Impact on the Target Population 
Generally, a state can be held liable for actions occurring outside its 
territory and jurisdiction only under exceptional circumstances such as 
situations when a state exercises control over a territory or when a state 
exercises authority and control over an individual.71 
The impact of a domestic action outside of the jurisdiction of a state 
can also trigger liability issues for the acting state. If a state’s domestic 
action leads to a violation of human rights outside of its jurisdiction, a state 
can be held liable.72 Sanction programs are not static, and their impact is not 
necessarily limited to the territory of the sanctioning state. Sanctioning states 
often resort to a variety of components to maximize the effectiveness of 
sanctions. This increases the pressure on the target state. As such, each 
sanction program might have a different humanitarian impact on the target 
population. These components consist in the nature of the sanction 
measures, the reach of these measures, the number of states adopting the 
 
70  Id. ¶ 23. 
71  Al Skeini v. United Kingdom, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18, 58–59, ¶¶ 133–38. (2011);. For further 
information, see generally Jane M. Rooney, The Relationship Between Jurisdiction and Attribution After 
Jaloud v. Netherlands, 62 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 407–28 (2015). 
72  Mehmet Şükrü Güzel, Venezuela Sanctions and the Concept of Extraterritorial Humanitarian 
Responsibility, 11 ZFWT 169, 184 (2019).  
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sanction measures and the dominant and exclusive control of the sanctioning 
state on the target’s transactional supply chain and economy. 
1. Comprehensiveness 
A major motivating factor for a sanctioning state increasing the power 
and impact of sanction programs relates to the scope of sanctions. The 
decision to increase the scope of sanctions and to extend the areas of 
prohibition to different sectors of the sanctioned state’s economy not directly 
related to the state’s wrongful act increases pressure on the civilian 
population in the sanctioned state.  
The catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the broad and 
comprehensive embargoes imposed by the UNSC in the 1990s on Iraq73 led 
to a major shift in the UNSC policy toward using economic sanctions. This 
shift forced the United Nations to step back from the traditional policy of 
designing comprehensive sanctions and adopt a smarter approach. Instead of 
sanctioning the target state’s whole economy, the UNSC has moved to 
sanctioning certain sectors and individuals directly related to the target 
state’s wrongful act.74 However, while comprehensive sanctions are no 
longer considered a multilateral solution to threats to peace and security, 
they are still used in the state-to-state unilateral context.75 The underlying 
reason for using comprehensive sanctions is that it pushes the ruling elites of 
the affected population to seek a change in the policies of their state to end 
the suffering of the sanctioned population.76 
Comprehensive sanctions have regressive effects on the right to health 
and food since the burden falls on the most vulnerable parts of the 
population.77 The decision-makers in the sanctioned state, who should really 
be the targets of these sanctions, may find the latter desirable and 
 
73  Jazairy, Unilateral Economic Sanctions, supra note 37, at 294. 
74  Peter Van Elsuwege, The Adoption of “Targeted Sanctions” and the Potential for Inter-
Institutional Litigation After Lisbon, 7 J. CONTEMP. EUR. RES. 488, 488 (2011). 
75  WALLENSTEEN, supra note 6, at 22–23. 
76  Howlett, supra note 9, at 1212. 
77  Idriss Jazairy (Special Rapporteur on the Negative Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures on the 
Enjoyment of Human Rights), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Negative Impact of Unilateral 
Coercive Measures on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/30/45, ¶ 16 (Aug. 10, 20153010, 
20185). 
316 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 29 NO. 2 
 
advantageous on a personal level.78 Comprehensive sanctions harm the 
sanctioned state’s economy in a significant manner by crippling sensitive 
income-generating sectors of the economy, especially in mono-product 
countries.79 Far-reaching comprehensive sanctions, in addition to negative 
macroeconomic consequences, usually lead to a chilling effect discouraging 
foreign business entities from engaging in authorized transactions, to avoid 
any unintentional violation of sanction measures.80 In addition, sanctions 
increase transaction costs by making public goods unavailable in the 
sanctioned state, causing a catastrophic situation in both economic and social 
terms. 
According to the CESCR, comprehensive sanctions cause “significant 
disruption in the distribution of food, pharmaceuticals and sanitation 
supplies, jeopardize the quality of food and the availability of clean drinking 
water, severely interfere with the functioning of basic health and education 
systems, and undermine the right to work.”81 Considering the above 
elements, the more comprehensive the sanction program is, the more 
powerful the impact of the restrictive measures and the more likely it is that 
they harm average citizens.82 
2. Extraterritoriality 
The other element strengthening the impact of sanction programs is 
the extraterritorial application of domestic sanction measures. The element 
of extraterritoriality in sanction programs, often known as secondary 
sanctions, aims at universalizing the restrictive measures by closing other 
 
78  General Comment No. 8, supra note 46, ¶ 3 (“In addition, their unintended consequences can 
include reinforcement of the power of oppressive élites, the emergence, almost invariably, of a black 
market and the generation of huge windfall profits for the privileged élites which manage it, enhancement 
of the control of the governing elites over the population at large, and restriction of opportunities to seek 
asylum or to manifest political opposition.”). 
79  See David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Introduction: Assessing Smart Sanctions, in SMART 
SANCTIONS: TARGETING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 12 (David Cortright & George A. Lopez eds., 2002) (Oil 
Embargo in comprehensive way in Iraq oil embargo in targeted way against Cambodia, Sierra Leone and 
Angola for the territories controlled by rebelled and armed groups). 
80  INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP Middle East Report No. 138, Spider Web: The Making and 
Unmaking of Iran Sanctions, INT’L CRISIS GRP. (Feb. 25, 2013), 
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/138-spider-web-the-making-and-unmaking-of-iran-sanctions.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QV6R-98VB] [hereinafter INT’L CRISIS GROUP REPORT].  
81  General Comment No. 8, supra note 46, ¶ 3. 
82  INT’L CRISIS GROUP REPORT, supra note 80, at ii. 
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trade alternatives for the target state, thereby increasing the reach of the 
sanctions. 
An extraterritorial sanction program sets certain restrictions on 
individuals and entities outside of the jurisdiction of the sanctioning state, 
who generally conduct business with the target state.83 Such programs assert 
that accessing the sanctioning state’s market should be penalized and 
punished as a breach of the domestic sanction provisions. This “jurisdiction 
by territorial extension of domestic law”84 has been highly controversial in 
international relations.85 It ignores the conventional understanding of 
jurisdiction toward other states causing the opposing states to react to these 
measures by enacting blocking statutes.86  
On the other side, the extraterritorial sanctions have been questioned 
as being unlawful with regards to its human rights impact toward target 
state.87 By generalizing the restriction to all commercial partners around the 
globe, extraterritorial sanctions remove any alternative ways for the 
sanctioned state to continue its foreign trade and reduces the bargaining 
power of the sanctioned state in doing trade, even trade of humanitarian 
goods.88 
3. Multilateralization 
One element that increases the power of sanction measures is the 
number of states adopting the same restrictive measure against the target 
country. Creating an effective coalition for the implementation of restrictive 
measures makes sanctions more likely to succeed and affects the financial 
and trading capacity of the target country. Sanctioning states have sought to 
design measures and actions ensuring “that sanctions measures are applied 
 
83  Jeffrey A. Meyer, Second Thoughts on Secondary Sanctions, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 905, 906 (2009). 
84  CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 94 (2nd ed. 2015); Joanne Scott, 
Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 87, 87–90 (2014).  
85  Jazairy, Unilateral Economic Sanctions, supra note 37, at 296. 
86  Council Regulation 2271/96, 19196 O.J. (L 309) 1 (EC) (for example, the EU Blocking Statue is 
to protect EU operators from the extra-territorial application of third country laws). 
87  Jazairy, Unilateral Economic Sanctions, supra note 37, at 296. 
88  Cedric Ryngaert, Extraterritorial Export Controls (Secondary Boycotts), 7 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 
625, 626 (2008). 
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multilaterally whenever possible.”89 However, this requires a continuous 
effort from sanctioning states to expand the reach of the restrictive measures 
by maintaining an alliance with all participants despite different objectives. 
Therefore, working with like-minded countries to grow the list of 
sanctioning states, with the aim of maximizing the impact of the sanction 
provisions, has been at the cornerstone of sanctioning states’ foreign policy.   
The comparison between the economic sanctions imposed against Iran 
in the 2010–2013 period, and the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and re-
imposition of secondary sanctions against Iran in May 2018, illustrates the 
importance of the multilateralization element to increase the power and 
impact of sanction programs. Multilateralism in sanction programs is 
generally ensured through the initiation or backing of the program by the 
UNSC. In July 2010, the European Union and the United States enacted two 
sanction regulations that set considerable prohibitions on Iran’s energy and 
financial sectors.90 These restrictions, introduced after the imposition of 
UNSC Resolution 1929 against Iran, had a significant impact on Iran’s 
economy and its foreign trade sector due to the adoption of similar 
prohibitive measures by Iran’s major trading partners, such as Switzerland, 
Canada, Australia, South Korea and Japan.91 The restrictions significantly 
impacted Iran’s economy. 
The multilateralization effort, even in the absence of a UNSC specific 
ruling on the prohibitive measure, can have a serious impact on the 
sanctioned state. The EU Council Decision dated January 23, 2012,92 which 
banned the purchase of Iranian crude oil, was adopted following discussions 
among high-level political decision-makers in Europe. It was the outcome of 
a multilateral effort initiated by the United States, which had enacted the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (“NDAA 2012”).93 
This set of sanction provisions, though going significantly further than the 
 
89  Canadian Sanctions Frequently Asked Questions, GOV’T OF CANADA, 
https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/ 
faq.aspx?lang=eng (last visited Feb. 4, 2020). 
90  Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP of 26 July 2010 O.J. (L 195) 39 (EC).  
91  Farshad Shamgholi, Sanctions Against Iran and Their Effects on the Global Shipping Industry 
(Spring 2012) (unpublished Master’s Thesis, Lund University),) (), 
http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=2520391&fileOId=3046709.). 
92  Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP of 23 Jan. 2012 O.J. (L 19) 22 (EC).  
93  Nat’l. Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81 (2012). 
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legal prohibitions provided under the UNSC resolutions against Iran,94 was 
orchestrated by a coalition of like-minded countries with a multilaterally 
agreed target.95 
4. Monopoly Situation 
A business transaction requires availability of certain logistical 
elements—such as banking relations, insurance, and means of 
transportation—without which a transaction could not be completed. Unlike 
extraterritorial sanctions, which directly address elements outside of the 
jurisdiction of the sanctioning state, holding a monopoly over one of the 
constituent elements of a business transaction enables the sanctioning state 
to give extraterritorial effect to its domestic measure, vis-à-vis individuals 
and entities outside of its territory.  
The U.S. banking system is a perfect example of such a monopoly. Its 
monopoly over banking payments, insurance, and transportation means U.S. 
domestic sanctions indirectly prevent individuals and entities, who are 
subject to a different jurisdiction, from providing domestically-prohibited 
services to the sanctioned state.96 In such a context, the United States enjoys 
a monopoly over one of the key components of the trading chain, thus 
impeding the formation of the business transactions, which should have been 
outside the scope of the U.S. jurisdiction, and making economic sanctions 
one of the utmost effective tools for dictating a desired foreign policy. 
a. The International Financial System: the U.S. Example 
The most important chain in a transaction, the monopoly for which is 
currently held by the United States, is the banking system. The banking 
system facilitates the transfer of the value of a transaction from one party to 
another. In the absence of such a crucial component, the transaction will not 
be completed. U.S. leverage over the international banking system comes 
 
94  S.C. Res. 1737, ¶ 3-19 (Dec. 27, 2006); S.C. Res. 1747, ¶ 5–8 (Mar. 24, 2007); S.C. Res. 1803, ¶ 
3-13 (Mar. 3, 2008); S.C. Res. 1929, ¶ 7-31 (June 9, 2010) (the UNSC Resolutions imposing economic 
restrictive measure against Iran were UNSC Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929). 
95  Scott, supra note 84, at 120. 
96  Robert J. Graves & Indranil Ganguli, Extraterritorial Application of the USA PATRIOT Act and 
Related Regimes: Issues for European Banks Operating in the United States, 3 PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY 
L.J. 967, 983 (2007). 
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from the dominance of the U.S. currency, which started as the reserve 
currency for most countries following the internationalization process of the 
U.S. Dollar.97 It also acts as the trade settlement currency due to the fact that 
it acts as a benchmark for commodity prices, such as oil, in global markets.98 
This makes the U.S. Dollar the usual currency for international transactions, 
foreign exchange reserves of central banks around the world and forex 
trading.99 The United States has used its banking leverage and the 
international financial mechanism as a powerful tool for limiting access to 
financial institutions breaching U.S. secondary sanctions through their 
conduct of “significant financial transactions”100 on behalf of sanctioned 
nationals and individuals, to the international banking system.101 The 
intertwining of the United States and global financial systems102 allows for 
the possibility of prohibiting certain entities and their banks from opening 
correspondent or payable-through accounts in the United States. Further 
actions, like restricting access to financial messaging services such as 
SWIFT,103 act as powerful instruments in the hands of the United States to 
punish foreign financial institutions that fail to comply with U.S. sanctions. 
Such actions, which take place either through judicial indictment, U.S. 
Treasury designation, or fines addressed to the major banks for their past 
actions facilitating transactions for a sanctioned state,104 can cause the 
 
97  Ramaa Vasudevan, Finance, Imperialism, and the Hegemony of the Dollar, MONTHLY REV., APR. 
1, 2008, at 3. 
98  Carla Norrlof, Dollar Hegemony: A Power Analysis, 21 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 1042, 1058 
(2014). 
99  Kimberly Amadeo, Why the US Dollar Is the Global Currency, The Balance, 
https://www.thebalance.com/world-currency-3305931 (last updated Dec. 13, 2019). 
100 Exec. Order No. 13,622, 70 C.F.R. 45897, Section 1 (July 30, 2012) (according to U.S. President 
Executive Order 13,622, foreign financial institutions that knowingly facilitate significant transactions or 
provide significant financial services for sanctioned entities or individuals are exposed to potential loss of 
access to the U.S. financial system). 
101  See https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1661.aspx (announcing the 
imposition of sanctions under the CISADA, against Bank of Kunlun in China and Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq 
for knowingly facilitating significant transactions or providing significant financial services for designated 
Iranian banks). 
102  Thomas Costigan, The US Dollar as the Global Reserve Currency: Implications for US 
Hegemony, 8 WORLD REV. OF POL. ECON. 104, 104 –22 (2017). 
103  The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Society_for_Worldwide_Interbank_Financial_Telecommunication (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
104  For example, Barclays was fined $298 Million in August 2010, Credit Suisse was fined $536 
Million in December 2010, Lloyds Banking $350 Million in January 2009, UBS was fined $100 Million, 
ABN Amro Bank NV $80 Million in December 2005, JP Morgan Chase $88.3 Million in August 2011, 
HSBC $1 Billion in May 2011, Standard Chartered $327 Million in December 2012, and Bank of Tokyo 
 
APRIL  2020 ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 321 
 
 
depletion of a bank’s deposits and even the permanent closure of the bank.105 
This forces the sanctioned state to make a considerable shift in its trade 
policy, at least on the short term.106    
Besides financial institutions, such restrictive measures can also target 
a banking jurisdiction in its entirety by sanctioning the use of the sanctioned 
state’s currency by other financial institutions.107 Designating the sanctioned 
state’s banking sector as an area at risk for money laundering is a further 
action that can be taken by sanctioning states. For example, the U.S. 
President’s decision in November 2011 designated Iran as an area of 
“primary money laundering concern”108 and authorized the United States to 
take special measures against foreign banks establishing corresponding 
relations with Iranian financial institutions. Such a domestic measure has 
had a significant impact on Iran’s banking sector, to the extent that even 
when U.S. secondary sanctions against Iran were lifted following the 
implementation of the Iran nuclear deal, Iran’s banking relations 
nevertheless failed to normalize with non-Iranian financial institutions.     
By using its dominant position in global financial markets, the United 
States’ actions went further than sanctioning international financial 
institutions and have been used as a powerful instrument to persuade 
international companies to walk away from doing business with the 
 
Mitsubishi UFJ was fined $250 Million in June 2013. See Oriana Roncarolo, Arms and Dual-Use Goods 
Export Controls, DELOITTE (Nov. 23, 2017), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/it/Documents/finance/dualusegoods/Opening%20Address
_O.%20Roncarolo.pdf. 
105  Nate Raymond & Lynnley Browning, Swiss Bank Wegelin to Close After Guilty Plea, 
REUTERS (Apr. 3, 2013, 7:11 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swissbank-wegelin-
idUSBRE9020O020130104 (explaining that U.S. indictment against the Switzerland’s oldest bank, Bank 
Wegelin & Co., caused the bank to close permanently).  
106  See Carrie Lyn Donigan Guymon, The Best Tool for the Job: The US Campaign to Freeze Assets 
of Proliferators and Their Supporters, 49 VA. J. INT’L 849, 877 (2009) (providing the example that the U.S. 
Treasury’s designation of Banco Delta Asia SARL as a “primary money laundering concern” on September 
2005, led to depletion of 34% of deposits from this bank and acted as a major element in causing North 
Korea to seriously re-engage in the Six Party Talks). 
107  Exec. Order 13,645, 78 C.F.R. 33945 (June 3, 2013) (for example, US sanctions against the 
Iranian currency (the Rial) under U.S. President Executive Order 13,645, June 3, 2013). 
108  Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (under section 
311 of the U.S. Patriot Act authorizing the United States to adopt special measures against a jurisdiction as 
a whole, an institution, a class of transactions or a type of account). 
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sanctioned state.109 In one of the most prominent cases, the French 
multinational oil company, Total, announced that following the U.S. 
withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and the reinstatement of U.S. 
secondary sanctions, it was not in a position to continue operating the mega-
project, South Pars 11, in Iran due to several U.S.-created risks,110 including 
the risk of “loss of financing in dollars by U.S. banks for [its] worldwide 
operations.” Indeed, U.S. banks were involved in more than ninety percent 
of Total’s financing operations.111  
The pressure and reputational risk for commercial partners working 
with a sanctioned state, including non-sanctioned areas, and the possibility 
of unknowingly breaching sanction provisions—exposing commercial 
partners to administrative and judicial enforcement actions in the United 
States—dissuades commercial partners from engaging in business 
transactions, whether or not they are permitted, due to the potential 
triggering of default events and acceleration clauses with their commercial 
counterparties.112 
b. The Insurance Industry: the EU Example 
Another major chain in transactions, necessary for completing any 
trading operation and modes of transportation of goods, is insurance. 
Insurance coverage, either for the cargo, the vessel or the ports, is required 
for a seller to ship goods to the buyer. Without insurance, a commercial 
transaction will not be completed. The European insurance industry provides 
most of the insurance coverage for the world’s maritime transportation. To 
some extent, the European Union and, in particular, the United Kingdom, 
 
109  Exec. Order No. 13,622, supra note 100, § 4 (imposing sanctions on the ISA sanctions menu 
including baring banks from the U.S. financial system, for certain activities including purchase of oil, other 
petroleum, or petrochemical products from Iran). 
110  See US Withdrawal From the JCPOA: Total’s Position Related to the South Pars 11 Project in 
Iran, TOTAL (May 16, 2018), https://www.total.com/en/media/news/press-releases/us-withdrawal-jcpoa-
totals-position-related-south-pars-11-project-iran (in addition to U.S. financing, Total mentioned the loss of 
its U.S. shareholders, which represent more than 30% of its shareholding, and its inability to continue its 
U.S. operations as other reason for halting its business relations in Iran). 
111  Id.  
112  Dick Ziggers, Iran Having Trouble Financing Grain Imports, ALL ABOUT FEED (Jan. 30, 2012), 
https://allaboutfeed.net/Process-Management/Management/2012/1/iran-having-trouble-financing-grain-
imports-AAF012736W/ (explaining major European banks, including Rabobank, have ceased financing 
grade and other agricultural trades bound for Iran).  
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enjoy the same leverage over the insurance industry as the United States has 
over the international banking system.  
This level of influence exerted by the European Union allowed their 
domestic measures to enjoy a significant extraterritorial effect, going so far 
as to affect the trade of foodstuffs and medicine.113 The EU ban on the 
(re)insurance of tankers carrying Iranian crude oil was an effective measure 
on the Iranian economy.114 European protection and indemnity insurers 
(“P&Is”)115 were unable to provide related services, thus leaving Iranian 
vessels without insurance coverage.116 
Restrictive measures on insurance and transportation not only 
significantly increase the cost of transactions,117 they also cause considerable 
delays (up to four times more than usual) in the importation of goods into 
the sanctioned state, assuming the commercial operators are able to complete 
their transactions at all.118 
5. The Economy of the Sanctioned State: Macroeconomic Consequences 
Another element affecting the efficacy of sanction programs concerns 
the sanctioned state’s macroeconomic structure and its degree of economic 
interdependence. The fact that the sanctioned state depends on outside 
sources for financial aid or food is key in assessing the humanitarian impact 
of economic sanctions. For example, the U.S. decision to deny credit 
 
113  Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations, SOR/2010-165 (Can.) (holding Canada’s 
expectation on the possibility of keeping Iran as a customer of its agricultural products in 2010 was that 
“while agricultural exports are specifically excluded from the sanctions, indirect measures placing 
restrictions on Iranian vessels and on financing can adversely affect the volume of the trade”). 
114  See Clare Baldwin & Osamu Tsukimori, Marine Insurance: The Stranglehold on Iran?, REUTERS 
(Apr. 17, 2012, 2:11 AM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/04/17/uk-iran-oil-insurance-
idUKLNE83G00G20120417. 
115  See Protection and Indemnity Insurance, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protection_and_indemnity_insurance (last visited on Feb. 25, 2020) (P&I 
insurance is a form of marine insurance provided by a P&I club, a mutual (i.e., co-operative) insurance 
association that provides cover for its members, who will typically be ship-owners, ship-operators, or 
demise charterers). 
116  Iran Offers to Insure Foreign Ships to Skirt EU Ban, Reuters (Jul. 17, 2012), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-shipping/iran-offers-to-insure-foreign-ships-to-skirt-eu-ban-
idUSBRE86G0XX20120717. 
117  By reportedly more than forty percent. See PAAIA, REPORT ON IRAN SANCTIONS 18 (August 
2012),  http://www.paaia.org/CMS/Data/Sites/1/PDFs/Iran%20Sanctions%20Report%202012.pdf. 
118 “Iran Shipbuilding Boycott Lifted” Does Not Solve Shipping Problem, BBC NEWS (Sept. 19, 
2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/business/2013/09/130919_l01_shipping_lines_eu_sanctions.shtml. 
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facilities to Poland that would have allowed it to buy U.S. corn had a 
considerable short-term impact on the Polish civilian population, due to 
Poland’s dependence on this external source for food.119 
The most devastating effects of sanctions stem from the 
macroeconomic consequences of economic sanctions on the target country. 
The impacts depend on the structure and the level of resilience of each 
economy. Macroeconomic repercussions of sanctions generally include high 
inflation, lowered purchasing power, and a reduction in access to essential 
goods.120 High inflation and the unavailability of external finance following 
the imposition of sanctions caused Sudan’s annual gross domestic product to 
decline.121 Malnourishment among children increased from five percent to 
twenty-three percent in Haiti following sanctions.122 The decline in 
economic activities,123 the inefficient allocation and utilization of resources, 
the unequal distribution of facilities and budget cuts in the health sector,124  
result in the spread of diseases, some of which become untreatable due to 
lack of access to clean water, sufficient food, and life-saving medicine.125 As 
an example, economic sanctions against Burma caused thousands of layoffs, 
including 100,000 women working in the textile industry and forced many 
unemployed women to engage in prostitution.126  
The role of foreign trade in the economy of a sanctioned state and the 
diversity of its income-generating exports of goods and services also play a 
major role in the level of impact sanctions will have. Targeting income-
generating sectors of an economy limits the financial capacity of a 
sanctioned state to continue its routine trade. This limitation, if it hits mono-
 
119  HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 3, at 201. 
120  Ioana Petrescu, The Humanitarian Impact of Economic Sanctions, 10 EUROPOLITY 205, 205–06 
(2016). 
121  SUZAN ADAM MOHAMMED HAMID, THE RAMIFICATIONS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON HEALTH 
SERVICE SYSTEM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SUDAN HEALTH SERVICE SYSTEM BEFORE AND AFTER 
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 35 (2012). 
122  Richard Garfield, The Silently, Deadly Remedy, 14 F. APPLIED RES. & PUB. POL’Y 52, 55 (1999). 
123  U.N. OFF. FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFF. & UNICEF, Economic Sanctions, 
Health, and Welfare in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 1990–2000, 28 (May 25, 2001) (“In 1991, prior 
to sanctions, trade averaged US $800 million per month. In 1994 it had declined to a low of US $200 
million per month.”). 
124  Garfield, Devin, & Fausey, supra note 28, at 465. 
125  HAMID, supra note 121, at 2. 
126  Donald M. Seekins, Burma and U.S. Sanctions: Punishing an Authoritarian Regime, 45 ASIAN 
SURV. 437, 442 (2005). 
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product economies, becomes particularly potent. Countries whose 
economies are almost exclusively based on the exportation of a limited 
number of commodities are the most vulnerable to sanctions. The economic 
sanctions against Iran were crippling once they began targeting the purchase 
of Iranian crude oil and oil products. 
The National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”), enacted in 2012 
and entered into force on January 23, 2012 by EU Council Decision,127 
prohibited the “import, purchase or transport of Iranian crude oil and 
petroleum products”128 and the “financing or financial assistance, including 
financial derivatives, as well as insurance and reinsurance” related to these 
activities.129 This led to a sharp drop in Iranian crude oil exports, as much as 
a third of usual exports.130 This amounted to a loss of $133 million per day 
and an annual loss of $48 billion, or approximately ten percent of the Iranian 
economy.131 The European Union’s decision to designate the Central Bank of 
Iran (“CBI”) as a sanctioned entity alongside identical U.S. measures,132 led 
to an international freeze at several financial institutions on the funds and 
assets of the CBI, which act as the main recipient of the proceeds of the sale 
of Iranian crude oil.133 The sanction measure against CBI, which also acts as 
financial facilitator for the trade of food and medicine in Iran,134 had a 
significant impact on the CBI’s operations and Iranians’ access to essential 
medicines.135 
 
127  Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP of 23 Jan. 2012 O.J. (L 19) 22 (EC). 
128  Id. at 23, art. 1(2)1. 
129  Id. at 23, art. 1(2)2. 
130  Rick Gladstone, Iranian Oil Minister Concedes Sanctions Have Hurt Exports, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/08/world/middleeast/irans-oil-exports-and-sales-down-40-
percent-official-admits.html. 
131  See Anthony DiPaola & Isaac Arnsdorf, Iran Loses $133 Million a Day on Embargo, Buoying 
Obama, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 2, 2012, 9:04 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-01/iran-loses-
133-million-a-day-from-sanctions-as-oil-buoys-obama.html. 
132  Exec. Order No. 13,622, supra note 100, § 5. 
133  Matt Pearce, Where Are Iran’s Billions in Frozen Assets, and How Soon Will It Get Them Back?, 
L.A. TIMES (Jan 20, 2016, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iran-frozen-assets-
20160120-story.html. 
134  Council Regulation 267/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 88) 1, 2 (EC) (due to the possible impact of these 
punitive measures, this Council Regulation provided that these restrictive measures “should not prevent 
trade operations, including contracts relating to foodstuffs, healthcare, medical equipment or for 
humanitarian purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Regulation”). 
135 Mehrnaz Kheirandish et al., Impact of Economic Sanctions on Access to Noncommunicable 
Diseases Medicines in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 24 E. MEDITERRANEAN HEALTH J. 42, 42 (2018). 
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6. Other Elements 
The gravity of the wrongful act being sanctioned confers greater 
legitimacy on such economic countermeasures. The impact of the sanctions 
on the affected population are also determined by further, “softer” elements. 
Such elements include the influence of specific pressure groups altering the 
effectiveness of economic sanctions in their early phases;136 the legal 
enforcement actions available within a sanction program, like the possibility 
of punishing any engagement, whether pursued knowingly or unknowingly 
by an entity, with sanctioned entities or activities;137 the level of judicial 
review available for sanction-related decisions and regulations;138 the use of 
more or less ambiguous legal terminology without any clear definitions or 
guidelines; and the provision of broad definitions increasing the scope of 
sanctions.139  
Finally, the manner in which the sanction is enforced and the 
seriousness of the application of legal measures play an important role in the 
severity of the sanctions.140 The sudden or gradual enforcement actions 
leading to a sanction,141 the aggressive approach of the sanctioning state,142 
 
136  For example, in the United States, the “Cuban lobby” with regards to sanctions against Cuba; the 
“Jewish lobby” with respect to sanctions on Libya, Iraq, and Iran; the “Armenian lobby” with respect to 
Azerbaijan; etc. See Thomas Ambrosio, Legitimate Influence or Parochial Capture? Conclusions on Ethnic 
Identity Groups and the Formulation of U.S. Foreign Policy, in ETHNIC IDENTITY GROUPS AND U.S. 
FOREIGN POLICY 206 (Thomas Ambrosio ed., 2002). 
137  Guymon, supra note 106, at 856 (noting that a person is subject to designation for engaging in 
activities that “pose a risk” of materially contributing to proliferation as opposed to making any actual 
contribution). 
138  See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018) (designating the statutory standard of review limits the courts’ 
determination to whether a decision is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law”); Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 373 F.3d 152, 158 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (holding the court is not permitted “to make any judgment whatsoever regarding whether the 
material before the Secretary is or is not true,” but is allowed to inquire “whether the Secretary had enough 
information before [him] to come to the conclusion”) (internal quotations omitted); Paradissiotis v. Rubin, 
171 F.3d 983, 987 (5th Cir. 1999). 
139  See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 8701 (2018) (incorporating the definition of “United States person” from 22 
U.S.C. § 8511 (2018) and lowering the EAR de minimis threshold for sanctioned countries, such Cuba and 
Iran, from 25% to 10%  U.S.-origin content, thus changing the definition of U.S. goods, for which U.S. 
control laws apply extraterritorially); see also Restricting Additional Exports and Reexports to Cuba, 84 
Fed. Reg. 56,117 (Oct. 21, 2019) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 734, 740, and 746), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/10/21/2019-22876/restricting-additional-exports-and-
reexports-to-cuba. 
140  SMART SANCTIONS, supra note 79, at 10. 
141  Walde, supra note 1, at 187. 
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the employment of non-legal measures, such as political and media pressure, 
and the way sanctions are portrayed in domestic politics of the target 
country143 also affect the efficacy of economic sanctions. 
B. The Human Rights Obligations of the Sanctioning State 
Sanctions are aimed at reducing trade flows, denying investment, and 
limiting foreign exchange and credit facilities to the country. Therefore, 
sanctions affect access to humanitarian goods because they have a negative 
impact on the macroeconomic indexes of the target economy, dropping the 
value of the sanctioned state’s currency, depleting the state’s foreign 
exchange reserves, causing liquidity shortages due to the inconvertibility or 
non-transferability of its income, and limiting access to funds needed for 
purchasing humanitarian goods.144 The negative macroeconomic impact 
along with the traders’ unwillingness to engage in trade with the sanctioned 
state due to reputational damage and difficulties in securing a method of 
payment and obtaining letters of credit, even for humanitarian goods,145 
makes ring-fencing the trade of humanitarian goods from the general impact 
of sanction programs impossible. 
The sanctioning state’s efforts to convince other states to adopt similar 
restrictive measures against the sanctioned state and a state’s monopoly in at 
least one of the components necessary for the formation of business 
transactions push foreign companies to refrain from permissible business of 
the target country. In addition, existence of factors such as the ambivalence 
of the sanction regulations, and political and media pressure can exacerbate 
the level of caution the international companies adopt in dealing with a 
sanctioned country. Restricted access to banking services and difficulties in 
 
142  For example, the U.S. announced in 2018 that it had adopted a maximum pressure policy and that 
harming Iran was the “actual[] intended consequence[]” of the sanctions regime. Background Briefing on 
President Trump's Decision to Withdraw From the JCPOA, U.S. DEP’T OF ST. (May 8, 2018), 
https://www.state.gov/background-briefing-on-president-trumps-decision-to-withdraw-from-the-jcpoa/.  
143  SELECT COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, supra note 16, ¶ 7. 
144  For example, following U.S. sanctions against Iran on oil sales, billions of dollars of payments for 
the purchase of Iranian oil were held up in South Korea and India due to the countries’ inability to complete 
funds transfers to Iran. See Cho Mee-young & Yoo Choonsik, Exclusive: Sanctions Trap Billions of Iran 
Pertrodollars in Korea, REUTERS (Aug. 31, 2011, 3:58 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-
korea/exclusive-sanctions-trap-billions-of-iran-petrodollars-in-korea-idUSTRE77228Q20110803. 
145  See Nigel Hunt & Michael Hogan, Exclusive: EU Banks Halt Iran Grain Trade Finance, REUTERS 
(Jan. 26, 2012, 10:05 PM), https://www.dailystar.com.lb/Business/Middle-East/2012/Jan-26/161189-eu-
banks-halt-iran-grain-trade-finance-traders.ashx.  
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securing insurance policies increase the associated risks and the cost of 
transactions. This consequently decreases overall trade volumes. As such, 
the general impact of sanctions on the whole economy makes it impossible 
to isolate the effects of comprehensive economic countermeasures on the 
access to food and medicine,146 leading to a generalized shortage of essential 
medicine and medical equipment.147 
1. Human Rights Impact Assessment 
The increase in the impact of sanction programs causes a higher level 
of care and duty for the sanctioning state to limit negative effects and to 
ensure that fundamental human rights, such as access to food and medicine, 
are protected. In this respect, the CESCR sets out obligations for states and 
organizations “responsible for the imposition, maintenance or 
implementation of the sanctions,” to fully take into account the social and 
economic rights provided for in the ICESCR when designing sanction 
programs. The Committee is of the view that the key provisions of the UN 
Charter dealing with human rights (Articles 1, 55, and 56) fully apply when 
imposing sanctions:148 “whatever the circumstances, such sanctions should 
always take full account of the provisions of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.”149 
The Human Rights Council presents a more structured approach to 
this obligation by stating that an effective “human rights impact 
assessment,”150 with the purpose of identifying, examining, and measuring 
the effects of sanctions on human rights “should become a non-derogable 
standard in cases of sanctions imposed by groups of States or regional 
organizations.”151 This impact assessment, which can be conducted not only 
by the sanctioning states, but also by NGOs and international 
organizations,152 should be conducted ex ante before sanction regimes are 
applied, with the “aim to measure the potential future effects of such 
 
146  Garfield, Devin, & Fausey, supra note 28, at 465. 
147  See, e.g., id. at 458. 
148  General Comment No. 8, supra note 46, ¶ 1. 
149  Id. ¶ 1. 
150  Jazairy, Unilateral Economic Sanctions, supra note 37, at 296. 
151  Id. 
152  Id. 
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measures on human rights” and possibly “adjust or change the sanctions 
regime with a view to preventing human rights violations.”153 
2. Monitoring and Responding to Suffering 
The humanitarian impact assessment of sanction measures should not 
be limited to the phase when sanctions are designed and introduced. The 
Council proposes that the impact assessment continue ex post by measuring 
“the actual impact of implemented sanctions through comparisons between 
the current situation and the situation before the measures were adopted.”154 
The ex post assessment shall include the materialized human rights risks, 
unforeseen effects, affected stakeholders, and the mitigating measures that 
could be adopted to reduce negative effects.155  
The CESCR also highlights proposals such as establishing “a United 
Nations mechanism for anticipating and tracking sanctions impacts” and 
“[creating] a better resourced set of sanctions committees”156 to better 
monitor the humanitarian impact of economic sanctions on the civilian 
population of the sanctioned state. After monitoring for negative effects, the 
sanctioning state would be required “to respond to any disproportionate 
suffering experienced by vulnerable groups within the targeted country.”157 
V. IRAN SANCTIONS: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ICJ’S RULING 
On May 8, 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew from the 
Iran 5+1 nuclear deal (the “JCPOA”) by issuing a National Security 
Presidential Memorandum (“NSPM”). Following the implementation of the 
JCPOA, endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2231 on July 20, 
2015, the UN, U.S., and EU sanctions against Iran, which were targeting 
almost the entire economy of Iran, were lifted. The significance of Iran’s 
nuclear activities to Western countries and Iran’s resistance to their sanctions 
mobilized the entire economic and political clout of the sanctioning states, 
 
153  Id. at 296–97. 
154  Id. at 297. 
155  See Human Rights Impact Assessments: A Review of the Literature, Differences with Other Forms 
of Assessments and Relevance for Development, NORDIC TR. FUND & THE WORLD BANK 30 (Feb. 2013), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/834611524474505865/pdf/125557-WP-PUBLIC-HRIA-
Web.pdf. 
156  General Comment No. 8, supra note 46, ¶ 12. 
157  Id. ¶ 14. 
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who ended up enacting what some view158 as some of the most punitive 
economic sanctions ever, with some of the most complex and severe sets of 
restrictive measures adopted by U.S. Department of Treasury.159  
The U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA led to the reinstatement of U.S. 
sanctions against Iran, including the U.S. Presidential Executive Orders and 
the main congressional acts, such as the Iran Sanctions Act, the Iran Threat 
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act, the National Defense Authorization 
Act, and the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act.160 Accordingly, the 
United States’ comprehensive and secondary sanctions were unilaterally 
imposed. Two ninety- and one-hundred-eighty-day wind-down periods were 
considered for non-U.S. companies to terminate their activities and exit 
Iran.161 The sudden decrease, by seventy percent, of the value of the Iranian 
currency162 following the imposition of U.S. sanctions against Iran in May 
2018, and the end of banking relations between Iranian and non-Iranian 
banks163 affected the importation and prices of imported medicines and 
goods used for the production of medicines in Iran.  
 
158  Patrick Goodenough, Obama Touts Toughest Iran Sanctions in History, But Report Questions 
Their Effectiveness, CNSNEWS (Oct. 23, 2012, 4:35 AM), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/obama-touts-
toughest-iran-sanctions-history-report-questions-their-effectiveness; Biden Touts Iran Sanctions as Ryan 
Voices Doubts, YAHOO! NEWS (Oct. 11, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/biden-touts-iran-sanctions-ryan-
voices-doubts-013524142--election.html.  
159 JUAN C. ZARATE, TREASURY'S WAR: THE UNLEASHING OF A NEW ERA OF FINANCIAL WARFARE 
315 (2013). 
160  Memorandum on Ceasing U.S. Participation in the JCPOA and Taking Additional Action to 
Counter Iran’s Malign Influence and Deny Iran All Paths to a Nuclear Weapon, WHITEHOUSE (May 8, 
2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/ceasing-u-s-participation-jcpoa-taking-additional-
action-counter-irans-malign-influence-deny-iran-paths-nuclear-weapon/. 
161  Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Re-Imposition of Sanctions Pursuant to the May 8, 
2018 National Security Presidential Memorandum Relating to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA), U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 1 (May 8, 2018), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/jcpoa_winddown_faqs.pdf. 
162  Mohammad Nasiri, Iranians Say US Sanctions Blocking Access to Needed Medicine, A.P. NEWS 
(July 30, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/23327f44786845dbbecee530664ee5a6. 
163  See Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, Ambiguity in Trump Sanctions Could Put Humanitarian Trade with 
Iran at Risk, BOURSE & BAZAAR (May 14, 2018), 
https://www.bourseandbazaar.com/articles/2018/5/10/deadly-ambiguity-in-trump-sanctions-move-risks-all-
humanitarian-trade-with-iran (“Interruptions in banking channels saw payments turn from the use of 
industry-standard letters of credit and deferred payment terms to cash-in-advance payments using exchange 
houses. Transaction and operational costs skyrocketed, with costs being passed on to the consumer, whose 
buying power was eroded by currency devaluation.”). 
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The re-imposition of U.S. comprehensive secondary sanctions on Iran 
and the humanitarian impact of these measures led Iran to initiate judicial 
proceedings before the International Court of Justice against the United 
States on July 18, 2018, based on the violation of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, 
Economic Relations, and Consular Rights.164 Iran further submitted a 
Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures.165 In its Request, Iran 
asked the court to order that the United States “immediately take all 
measures at its disposal to ensure the suspension of the implementation and 
enforcement of all of the sanctions from May 8, including the extraterritorial 
sanctions.”166  
The United States argued that the U.S. sanctions targeting the Iranian 
economy provided for broad authorizations and exceptions167 “for 
conducting or facilitating a transaction for the provision (including any sale) 
of agricultural commodities, food, medicine or medical devices to Iran.”168 
However, Iran claimed that despite these carve-outs and exemptions, the 
applicable measures made the importation of urgently needed supplies 
impossible and “deeply affected the delivery and availability” of life-saving 
medicines and medical equipment to the Iranian people.169 
Iran, in its claim arguing for the detrimental impact of U.S. sanctions 
on Iranian civilians, referred to certain elements in the U.S. sanctions that 
could amplify their impact. Iran referred to statements made by U.S. 
authorities expressing their “[determination] to cause even greater 
prejudice”170 against Iran,  tighten the screws on Iran,171 and about the U.S. 
 
164  Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights 
(Islamic Republic of Iran v. U.S.), Application Instituting Proceedings, 2018 I.C.J. 175 (July 16). 
165  Iranian Provisional Measures, supra note 12, ¶ 77 (explaining the request for provisional measures 
was submitted pursuant to Article 41 of the Statute and to Articles 73, 74, and 75 of the Rules of 
International Court of Justice. The Court’s power to indicate provisional measures exist when there is a risk 
that irreparable prejudice could be caused to rights which are the subject of judicial proceedings, or when 
the alleged disregard of such rights may entail irreparable consequences and if there is urgency, in the sense 
that there is a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice will be caused before the Court gives its 
final decision). 
166  Id. ¶ 14. 
167  Clarifying Guidance on Humanitarial Assistance and Related Exports to the Iranian People, 
TREASURY DEP’T OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL (Feb. 6, 2013), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/hum_exp_iran.pdf. 
168  Exec. Order No. 13,645, supra note 108, § 2(e). 
169  Iranian Provisional Measures, supra note 12, ¶ 81. 
170  Id. ¶ 80. 
171  Id. ¶ 82. 
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administration’s maximum pressure policy and the announcement of further 
sanctions and their chilling effects.172 These were important facts in 
establishing a real and imminent risk that would cause irreparable prejudice. 
This matter highlights the importance of the sanctioning state’s approach 
when increasing the impact of its sanctions.173 Additionally, Iran referred to 
the extraterritorial element to show how the impact of U.S. sanctions 
exacerbated their chilling effect on many foreign companies and nationals, 
who announced “their withdrawal from activities in Iran, including the 
termination of their contractual relations with Iranian companies and 
nationals.”174 
On October 3, 2018, the ICJ issued an interim order establishing an 
important step in the role of human rights obligations when designing and 
imposing economic sanctions.175 Although the court order was instituted 
mainly in accordance with the 1955 Treaty of Amity, it marks a new 
development with regard to the duty of the sanctioning state vis-à-vis the 
fundamental human rights of the sanctioned state’s civilian population. 
A. Importance of the Impact 
The ICJ first reminded the parties of the importance of human rights 
obligations. The “importation and purchase of goods required for 
humanitarian needs” was discussed as a necessary element that cannot be 
superseded, even by measures “necessary to protect . . . essential security 
interests” of the sanctioning states.176 Further, the court, instead of reviewing 
the domestic sanction measure of the sanctioning state, focused on the 
impact of the sanction measures and deemed that a sanctioning state’s mere 
textual exemption and expression of best endeavor is insufficient for 
claiming fulfillment of its duty of care. These elements “are not adequate to 
address fully the humanitarian and safety concerns raised by the 
Applicant.”177  
 
172  Id. ¶ 72. 
173  Jazairy, Unilateral Economic Sanctions, supra note 37, at 296. 
174  Iranian Provisional Measures, supra note 12, ¶ 83. 
175  Id. 
176  Iranian Provisional Measures, supra note 12, ¶ 68. 
177  Id. ¶ 92. 
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The court’s findings regarding the existence of an “Imminent Risk,” 
“Irreparable Impact,”178 and “Irreparable Prejudice,” to assess whether the 
requirements for an interim order were satisfied, went a step further from 
focusing only on the domestic sanctions measure. The court considered the 
“irreparable consequences” the sanctions may have on the population of the 
sanctioned state, without being merely satisfied with “rights relating to the 
importation and purchase of goods required for humanitarian needs.”179 In 
addition, the court noted the restrictions on companies providing 
maintenance for Iranian aviation companies.180 This provided an insight that 
the court may also take into account how the sanction measure spells out in 
practice.   
The United States’ claim that “there could be multiple causes to which 
the economic stagnation and difficulties in Iran can be attributed, including 
mismanagement by the Iranian Government” was ruled out by the court on 
the basis that it is difficult “to assess the specific impact of its measures on 
the Iranian economy.”181 In return, the court emphasized the objective 
outcome of the sanctions and observed that despite the fact that the 
importation of food, medical supplies, and equipment is exempted from the 
U.S. sanctions, “it appears to have become more difficult in practice, since 
the announcement of the measures by the United States, for Iran, Iranian 
companies and nationals to obtain such imported foodstuffs, supplies and 
equipment.”182 
B. The Procedure for Granting Licenses 
The humanitarian exemptions have been mostly structured in a 
manner which require prior U.S. government approval for transactions and 
payments related to exempted supplies. The ambiguity, arbitrary nature, and 
inconsistent interpretations of these exemptions have caused delays, 
confusion, and, in some cases, denial of requests to export humanitarian 
goods.183 The procedural difficulties in obtaining approvals for exempted 
 
178  Id. ¶ 91 (“The Court is of the view that a prejudice can be considered as irreparable when the 
persons concerned are exposed to danger to health and life . . . .”). 
179  Id. ¶ 90. 
180  Id. ¶ 88. 
181  Id. ¶ 85. 
182  Id. ¶ 89. 
183  General Comment No. 8, supra note 46, ¶ 5. 
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supplies and the fear of prosecution under sanctions enforcement actions 
impede the task of aid agencies184 and have resulted in many international 
firms and entities refusing to sell humanitarian goods, thus significantly 
affecting the level of access to life-saving medicine and food.185  
A major factor in making the humanitarian carve-outs more 
compatible with the effective protection of fundamental human rights has 
been monitoring the procedure for granting licenses. Establishing uniform 
criteria and definitions for these exemptions, as well as operational criteria 
for sanctions committees, is of the utmost importance.186 CESCR, without 
endorsing any proposal, notes that proposals should have a “more 
transparent set of agreed principles and procedures based on respect for 
human rights,” “authorization of agreed technical agencies to determine 
necessary exemptions,” and the “introduction of greater overall 
flexibility.”187   
The European Union’s restrictive measures against Iran provide a 
clear example of an increased observation for the trade of humanitarian 
goods. The measures set a more relaxed licensing procedure when increasing 
embargo measures. Initially, the EU Regulation of October 15, 2010,188 
included only limited, weak humanitarian exemptions.189 However, the EU 
Council later moved towards toughening the embargo against Iran and 
adopted Council Regulation 267/2012, which was accompanied by the 
introduction of a new mechanism for granting authorizations to ease 
investment in “food, agricultural, medical, or other humanitarian 
purposes.”190 The authorization regime for trade transactions was also eased, 
by lifting the “appropriate end-user guarantees” and removing Iran’s 
undertaking “not to use the goods or technology concerned . . . in 
 
184  LARRY MINEAR ET AL., INST. FOR INT’L STUDIES, TOWARD MORE HUMAN AND EFFECTIVE 
SANCTIONS MANAGEMENT: ENHANCING THE CAPACITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM 58 (1998).  
185  See, e.g., Garfield, Devin, & Fausey, supra note 28, at 460 (serious delays occurred while foreign 
firms sought U.S. authorization for the sale of medicines to Cuba, and on several occasions the product was 
useless by the time it arrived). 
186  Id. at 467–68. 
187  General Comment No. 8, supra note 46, ¶ 12. 
188  Council Regulation 961/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 281) 1.  
189  See id. art. 7 (providing humanitarian exceptions, including “appropriate end-user guarantees”). 
190  Council Regulation 267/2012, art. 19, 2012 O.J. (L 88) 1, 9. 
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proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or for development of nuclear 
weapon delivery systems.”191  
The court’s order following Iran’s request provides guidance on how 
humanitarian carve-outs should be drafted and enforced to meet human 
rights requirements. In this context, the court found that merely providing an 
explicit textual humanitarian carve-out or “licensing policy providing for a 
case-by-case issuance of licenses”192 does not meet the humanitarian 
obligation of the sanctioning state. Rather, “[t]he United States of America 
shall ensure that licenses and necessary authorizations are granted.”193 The 
court’s ruling was a further step in defining sanctioning obligations as 
results-oriented rather than means-oriented. 
One of the major elements when designing the humanitarian carve-out 
is identifying a wide range of exempted goods and services. Prohibitions on 
importing necessary medical equipment, such as incubators or catheters for 
babies,194 or excluding certain pharmaceutical inputs from the humanitarian 
exemptions adversely affect the production of medicine in the sanctioned 
state.195 The adverse impact of these deficiencies significantly increased the 
humanitarian impact of sanctions in countries such as Iraq,196 Yugoslavia,197 
and Burundi.198 To address this deficiency, the CESR’s General Comment 8 
highlights the proposal of  having a “wider range of exempt goods and 
services”199 in order to make sanction programs more compatible with 
human rights obligations. 
This element was not invoked by Iran in its Request, but it was 
referred to by the court indirectly in its enumeration of humanitarian goods 
and elaboration of further goods necessary for the safety of civil aviation. In 
 
191  Id. art. 7.  
192  Iranian Provisional Measures, supra note 12, ¶ 86. 
193  Id. ¶ 102. 
194  HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 3, at 603. 
195  Petrescu, supra note 120, at 210. 
196  Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Third Periodic Rep. on the Work of Its Seventeenth 
Session, E/C.12/1/Add.17, ¶ 7 (Dec. 12, 1997). 
197  See Michael P. Scharf & Joshua L. Dorosin, Interpreting UN Sanctions: The Rulings and Role of 
the Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 771, 784–86 (1993). 
198  Julia Grauvogel, Regional Sanctions Against Burundi: A Powerful Campaign and its Unintended 
Consequences 10 (German Inst. of Global & Area Studies Working Paper No. 225, 2014). 
199  General Comment No. 8, supra note 46, ¶ 12. 
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its interim ruling, the ICJ provided that the United States “shall remove, by 
means of its choosing, any impediments arising from the measures 
announced on 8 May 2018 to the free exportation to the territory of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran of (i) medicines and medical devices; (ii) foodstuffs 
and agricultural commodities; and (iii) spare parts, equipment and associated 
services (including warranty, maintenance, repair services and inspections) 
necessary for the safety of civil aviation.”200 
C. The Removal of Any Impediment and Banking Payment 
One of the main elements increasing the impact of sanction measures 
is the control of the sanctioning state over a necessary chain in a transaction. 
The United States’ leading role in financial markets and multinational 
companies’ dependence on access to banking payment services necessary for 
conducting humanitarian trade operations with Iran201 have had a major 
extraterritorial impact on the importation of humanitarian goods to 
Iran.202 The impact of banking sanctions, especially those blocking 
transactions, have not only impacted the flow of humanitarian goods but also 
prevented donations from foreign charities, including those approved by the 
U.S. Treasury.203  
Due to these impediments and banking difficulties experienced under 
the previous Iran sanctions regime between 2010–2015, the Swiss 
government, following the introduction of U.S. sanctions on May 8, 2018, 
entered into discussions with the U.S. administration to establish a 
humanitarian channel with Iran. 204 The goal of the Swiss government was to 
seek “some sort of ‘certainty’ for banks involved [in humanitarian trade with 
Iran] so that they will not be excluded from the U.S. market” and clarity on 
the permissibility of “the transfer of Iranian-origin funds into the Swiss 
accounts” when Iranian importers pay Swiss importers for humanitarian 
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goods. Though these requests were consistent with existing U.S. sanctions 
laws, they were blocked by the U.S. administration in 2018.205 In addition, 
the U.S. administration took a step further in designating Parisian Bank,206 a 
major Iranian bank handling banking payment for humanitarian trade, as a 
Specially Designated Global Terrorist (“SDGT”).207 This decision came as a 
big surprise to Iran’s humanitarian trade.  
Iran’s request also stated that “‘sanctions” on the purchase or 
acquisition of U.S. dollar banknotes and on significant transactions related to 
the purchase or sale of Iranian rial plainly impose restrictions on the making 
of payments, remittances, and other transfers to or from Iran.”208 The ICJ 
observed that “as a result of the measures, certain foreign banks have 
withdrawn from financing agreements or suspended co-operation with 
Iranian banks.”209 These foreign banks refused to accept banking transfers 
and ceased all corresponding relations.  
The court found that “it has become difficult if not impossible for 
Iran, Iranian companies and nationals to engage in international financial 
transactions that would allow them to purchase items not covered, in 
principle, by the measures, such as foodstuffs, medical supplies and medical 
equipment.”210 The court ruled that having “broad authorizations and 
exceptions to allow for humanitarian-related activity”211 does not meet the 
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minimum requirement for the protection of human rights. It ruled that the 
United States “shall remove, by means of its choosing, any impediments 
arising from the measures announced on 8 May 2018 to the free exportation 
to the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran” of humanitarian goods.212  
The ruling is a general obligation that could include any legal or 
administrative hurdle that might adversely affect trade of humanitarian 
goods. However, in this respect, the court singled out one of the most 
important elements in the formation of trading transactions: banking 
payments. Indeed, as seen previously, the United States has major leverage 
over international trading systems through its control of banking payments. 
Finally, the court ruled that the United States should ensure “that payments 
and other transfers of funds are not subject to any restriction” insofar as they 
“relate to humanitarian goods and services.”213 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Economic sanctions are the most prevalent policy tools for 
decisionmakers in international relations. They have been widely used by the 
powerful and economically advanced states to enhance their foreign policy. 
The global economic structure and complicated nature of international trade 
relations have created a complex picture of countermeasures in the human 
rights context. The general regression of social and economic rights, the 
impact of economic sanctions on the trade of humanitarian goods due to 
negative macroeconomic effects, and the significant increase in transaction 
costs have made the merely textual legal carve-outs in sanctions an 
insufficient policy for addressing these humanitarian consequences. 
In this context, a sanctioning state, while not required to provide 
direct humanitarian assistance to the sanctioned country, cannot be released 
from its liability if it only limits its actions to the mere inclusion of textual 
waivers for humanitarian goods in its sanction programs. The lack of clear 
procedures for such carve-outs and their related payments, the fining of 
major international financial institutions for facilitating payments related to 
sanctioned economies, the approach of the sanctioning state in exerting 
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maximum pressure on the sanctioned state, the structure of the sanctioned 
economy, and the comprehensive nature and extraterritorial implementation 
of domestic laws all play a role in enhancing the power of a sanction 
program, and consequently affect the importation of humanitarian goods to 
the sanctioned country.  
The Order of the ICJ pursuant to the Alleged Violations of the 1955 
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Islamic 
Republic of Iran v. United States of America) case established a legal 
precedent in designing and structuring economic sanctions and humanitarian 
carve-outs. Although the court bound its jurisdiction on the Treaty of Amity, 
its decision concerning the irreparable damages of the reinstatement of U.S. 
secondary sanctions on May 8, 2018 provides an insight into how a sanction 
regime must be designed to be more compatible with human rights 
obligations.  
The Court ruling provided that a licensing policy, based on a “case-
by-case” issuance of licenses, does not meet the humanitarian obligation of 
the sanctioning state. The sanctioning state must, therefore, ensure that 
licenses and necessary authorizations are “effectively granted.” In addition, 
the court ruled for the insufficiency of the broad authorizations and waivers 
regime and required that any impediment arising from sanction measures to 
the free exportation of humanitarian goods to the sanctioned state must be 
removed by the sanctioning state. To this end, the court, due to the United 
States’ domination of the international financial system, highlights the issues 
encountered by legitimate financial institutions with banking transfers. The 
sanctioning state must ensure that the banking transfers related to 
humanitarian goods and services are not subject to any restriction. 
The more sanction regimes increase in strength and scope, the higher 
the level of obligation of the sanctioning state in seeking the “protection of 
fundamental human rights,” especially in relation to the civilian population 
of the sanctioned state. This obligation goes beyond providing mere textual 
exceptions and authorizations in sanction laws and regulations and shall take 
into consideration the power of the sanctioning state and the effect of the 
restrictive measures on the population of the sanctioned state. Therefore, 
when it comes to U.S. economic sanctions, the United States, due to its 
greater authority in global financial system, shall ensure that the banking 
transfers related to humanitarian goods shall be made without any 
restriction. 
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